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THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT: ONE NATION
UNDER GOD SURVEILLANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Early in the morning on December 16, 2005, people across the United
States awoke to the smell of freshly brewed coffee and learned that their
own government had been spying on them for over three years.1 A New
York Times (Times) article revealed that President George W. Bush
authorized a secret wiretapping program for the National Security Agency
(NSA) in the months following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist
attacks.2 Current and former officials from the Bush Administration
discussed the story with journalists from the Times because these officials
had legitimate concerns about the legality and oversight of the operation.
According to the Times article, "the intelligence agency ha[d] monitored
the international telephone calls... of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
people inside the United States without warrants" and eavesdropped "on up
to 500 people in the United States at any given time."4
In the weeks and months following the publication of the Times
article, the Bush Administration conducted damage control, often
appearing in the media to assert the program's legality.5  The Bush
Administration even claimed that domestic surveillance was necessary to
combat terrorism 6 (although this argument has not been frequently
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Bush and His Senior Aides Press On in Legal
Defense for Wiretapping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at A13; Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales and Gen. Michael
Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat'l Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1 .html [hereinafter Gonzales &
Hayden]; Eric Lichtblau & David E. Sanger, Administration Cites War Vote in Spying Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at Al; Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Top Aide Defends Domestic Spying,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at Al.
6. Michele Norris, Gonzales: Spying Covered by Force Authorization, NPR, Jan. 24, 2006,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5170875.
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asserted). The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) asserted two
legal foundations to support the President's authorization of the NSA
program: (1) an inherent constitutional power and (2) an express power
granted by Congress when it enacted the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) to combat terrorism.7
A mere eight days after it first exposed the NSA program, the Times
published another article revealing that the NSA was able to monitor and
gather information on millions of people because it gained the cooperation
of major American telecommunications companies.8 The Times reported
that these companies allowed the NSA "to obtain backdoor access to
streams of domestic and international communications. ...9 Soon after
the Times published the article, civil liberties groups flooded companies
like AT&T and Verizon with lawsuits. One such group, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF), alleged that AT&T had "opened its key
telecommunications facilities and databases to direct access by the NSA
and/or other government agencies, intercepting and disclosing to the
government the contents of its customers' communications as well as
detailed communications records about millions of its customers .... 10
Based on the value of the claims asserted, these companies faced potential
bankruptcy if left to fend for themselves."1  Initially, the Bush
Administration intervened in these suits by asserting the state secrets
privilege.' 2 Sometimes referred to as the "nuclear bomb of legal tactics,"'
' 3
the state secrets privilege effectively prevents any disclosure of evidence
that the government deems a threat to national security. 14 However, the
7. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
NAT'L SEC. AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, 1, 6-7, (2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [hereinafter DOJ WHITEPAPER].
8. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Lichtblau & Risen, Spy Agency].
9. Id.
10. See Amended Complaint for Damages at 6, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d
974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C-06-0672-JCS).
11. Chris Roberts, Transcript: Debate on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, EL
PASO TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_6685679; James Risen
& Eric Lichtblau, Ex- Worker atAT&TFights Immunity Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at A22.
12. John Markoff, U.S. Steps Into Wiretap Suit Against A T&T, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006,
at A9.
13. Steven Aftergood, State Secrets Privilege Gets a Workout, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS, Apr.
23, 2002, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2002/04/042302.html.
14. See Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 917 (N.D. Il1. 2006); Carrie Newton
Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding its Scope Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 99, 104, 109 (2007); Bernard Hibbitts, DOJ Wants NSA Wiretapping Suits
Dismissed on State Secrets Basis, JURIST, May 28, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/05/doj-wants-nsa-wiretapping-suits.php.
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Bush Administration sought a more permanent solution15 after one federal
court declined to apply the privilege,16 and another federal court held that
the NSA violated the Constitution.
17
The ironically titled Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA) 18 is the focus
of the ongoing debate on whether the Bush Administration sacrificed
individuals' fundamental liberties in exchange for domestic security. 19 The
PAA amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),2 °
and effectively removed the system of checks and balances on the
Executive Branch's authority to wiretap international phone calls.2 1
Conveniently, the PAA also included an immunity provision that shielded
telecommunications companies from any future lawsuits.22 Because the
provision only granted immunity from future suits, the Bush
Administration continued to publicly condemn Congress' resistance to a
retroactive application of the immunity provision.23 Congress eventually
passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), which includes a
retroactive immunity clause.24
On one hand, proponents such as Mike McConnell, Director of
National Intelligence, argue that the PAA is vital to early detection of
terrorist plots, and that "our intelligence professionals [are] 'missing a
significant amount of foreign intelligence"' without the legislation.25 On
the other hand, critics, such as the American Civil Liberties Union
15. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Congress Must Act Now to Keep a
Critical Intelligence Gap Closed (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080122-2.html.
16. John Markoff, Judge Declines to Dismiss Privacy Suit Against AT&T, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 2006, at A13.
17. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
18. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, §105(b), 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
19. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1.
20. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2008).
21. American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Fact Sheet on the "Police America Act",
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/31203res20070807.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet].
22. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
23. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Legislation (Oct. 10, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/; Roberts, supra note 11; Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act and Protect America Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) (statement of J. Michael McConnell, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence).
24. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
25. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: The Protect America Act of 2007
(Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070806-5.html [hereinafter
Press Release].
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(ACLU), argue that the legislation allows for a massive collection of data
without any oversight by the courts or Congress.26 Some Democrats, like
Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, claimed that the passage of the PAA
was politically motivated 27 because Democrats faced their first election
year in 2008 after they gained control of Congress in 2006. One political
commentator seemed to agree with Feingold's assessment when he claimed
that Democrats feared "appearing weak on national security issues" and
wanted to avoid spending the August recess defending themselves from
Republican accusations that they "left Americans exposed to threats., 28 As
one Internet blogger wrote, "the Democrats can rest easily over the August
recess, knowing that they haven't left themselves vulnerable to political
attacks. The rest of us can worry about whether the NSA is using its
enhanced surveillance authority to spy on Americans. 29
This Comment examines the scope of the PAA, the legality of
telecommunications companies' participation, and the possible
ramifications of passing such controversial legislation. The NSA program
and cooperation of major telecommunications companies are eerily similar
to the events that gave rise to FISA in 1978.30 The recurrence of these
issues is forcing a new generation of Americans to find a balance between
the security of the country and the protection of civil liberties. 3 Although
the Bush Administration believed it was protecting the nation with these
laws, 32 scholars argued that this type of legislation actually supports the
goals terrorists seek to achieve.33 Terrorists use attacks like the ones on
9/11 as a tool to "influence the decisions of the government and the opinion
of the population." 34 While some experts disagree on the true objectives of
26. Fact Sheet, supra note 21.
27. Eric Lichtblau, James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, Reported Drop in Surveillance Spurred a
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at Al.
28. Carl Hulse & Edmund L. Andrews, House Approves Changes in Eavesdropping
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, at Al.
29. Posting of Daniel Schulman to Mother Jones, Let the Warrantless Wiretapping Resume,
http://www.mothejones.com/mojoblog/archives/2007/08/5097 let-thewarantl.html (Aug. 5,
2007, 9:02 EST).
30. Scott Shane, For Some, Spying Controversy Recalls a Past Drama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2006, at A18.
31. Id.
32. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses the Protect America
Act of 2007 (Sept. 19, 2007), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070919.html [hereinafter Sept. 2007 Press
Release].
33. Symposium, Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: The Definition of Terrorism
and the Challenge of Relativism, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1995 (2006).
34. Id. at 1996.
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any terrorist group, they cannot deny that terrorism has profoundly affected
the diminution of Americans' civil liberties.35
Part II of this Comment discusses the legislative background of the
current law and the collateral effect of the involvement of
telecommunications companies, including a comparison between the events
leading up to the passage of FISA and those leading up to the passage of
the PAA. This section also examines how the exposure of the NSA's
warrantless wiretapping program created two substantial setbacks in the
government's terrorism prevention strategy, and how the PAA solved both
problems. Part III examines the significance and legality of participation
by telecommunications companies, and analyzes the legislative efforts to
safeguard those companies from liability. This section also analyzes the
potential for government abuse under the PAA given its vague language.
Part III also weighs the benefits of such laws against the civil liberties that
are compromised. Part IV highlights the subsequent enactment of the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 and concludes that both pieces of legislation
compromised constitutionally guaranteed rights in exchange for the illusion
of domestic security.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hersh, Church, and Cheney
From late 1974 through 1975, journalist Seymour Hersh wrote a
series of stories in the New York Times (Times), reporting that the FBI and
CIA were conducting illegal intelligence operations on tens of thousands of
Americans.36 Hersh also reported that the government was conducting
illegal wiretaps on the Soviet Union inside its three-mile territorial limit.
37
These explosive revelations spurred the Senate to form the United
States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities. 38  The "Church Committee," which
35. See id. at 1997 (presenting arguments of Jean-Francois Gayraud, David Senat, and
others that international mass terrorism does not have a political goal, other than the destruction
of the political sphere); but see ROBERT E. GOODIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH TERRORISM? 49
(2006) (arguing that terrorism is "a political tactic, involving the deliberate frightening of people
for political advantage").
36. Lou DUBOSE & JAKE BERNSTEIN, VICE 32-34 (2006).
37. Id. at 34.
38. Gregory E. Birkenstock, Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards
of Probable Cause: An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 848 (1992).
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derived its name from its chairman, Senator Frank Church,39 found that
both the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Executive Branch 40 had
enlisted the help of AT&T and Western Union to aid in the wiretapping
program. These companies provided access to almost all communications
between American citizens and people in foreign countries. 42  At the
program's peak, the government was reviewing 150,000 messages per
month, all without a single warrant.43 When the House of Representatives
attempted to subpoena records from AT&T, the Ford Administration
intervened, stating that "the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
was and is an agent of the United States acting under contract with the
Executive Branch., 44 While Republicans complained of national security
issues, Democrats talked of the dangers to civil liberties. 45  Edward H.
Levi, the Attorney General at the time, even argued that "courts had upheld
the [P]resident's power to order surveillance for foreign intelligence
without warrants. 46
As Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense, respectively, Dick
Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld successfully encouraged President Gerald
Ford to extend the "state secrets doctrine" to the embroiled
telecommunications companies, shielding them from testifying publically.47
Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld also reviewed various legislative proposals
48based on the results of the Church Committee's reports. Not surprisingly,
despite the reports' publication in 1976, prescriptive legislation on
government eavesdropping was not adopted until the administration of
Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1978.
49
With its enactment, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
39. Id.
40. L. Britt Snider, Recollections from the Church Committee's Investigation of NSA, CIA,
Apr. 14, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art4.html.
41. DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 36.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Shane, supra note 30.
46. Id.
47. Jon Ponder, Operation Shamrock: NSA 's First Domestic Spying Program was Revealed
by Congress in 1975, PENSITO REVIEW, May 13, 2006,
http://www.pensitoreview.com/2006/05/13/operation-shamrock-nsas-first-domestic-spying-
program-was-shut-down-by-congress-in- 1975/.
48. DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 23, 32 (explaining that while Dick Cheney
served as Deputy Chief of Staff and Donald Rumsfeld served as Chief of Staff, neither appeared
to be in favor of judicial oversight of electronic surveillance).
49. Id. at 37.
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(FISA) struck a balance between the preservation of individual liberty and
the Executive Branch's ability to "protect the nation from security
threats." 50 But FISA was more than just a limit on government power since
it was specifically written "to restrain how telecoms cooperate with
Government spying requests.",5' According to Cindy Cohn, Legal Director
for the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), since Congress knew
preventing the government from eavesdropping was not enough to protect
Americans' civil liberties, "[it] had to create an independent duty for the
telecom carrie[r]s not to participate in illegal surveillance., 52  In other
words, the telecommunications companies were "forbidden from handing
over [their] communications and communications records to the
Government without proper legal process. 53  Congress included this
prohibition in FISA, in part, because the Church Committee's final report
revealed the complete lack of structure and oversight for eavesdropping
54and exposed just how vulnerable Americans were.
The Church Committee found that the companies essentially provided
unfettered access to all international communications and allowed the NSA
to sort through and determine which messages would be reviewed.55 For
example, the final report stated that ITT World Communications (ITT)
allowed "access to all incoming, outgoing, and transiting messages.,
56
Additionally, the Church Committee found that the government recorded
and developed all traffic before being returned to the company.57 Even
more chilling was the report's revelation that, aside from members of the
NSA and a select few in the Truman Administration, no government
official knew of the program's existence, ostensibly indicating that the
program lacked judicial and congressional oversight.
58
During congressional hearings on FISA, a representative of the
American Privacy Foundation stated that two major telecommunications
companies, RCA and ITT, had provided all of their customer
50. Jeremy Neff, Comment, Does (FISA + NSA) * A UMF- Hamdi = Illegal Domestic
Spying?, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 891 (2006).
51. Glenn Greenwald, The Political Establishment and Telecom Immunity- Why it Matters,
SALON, July 5, 2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/07/05/monarchy.
52. Glenn Greenwald, The Truth About Telecom Amnesty, SALON, Oct. 17, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/10/17/amnesty/.
53. Id.
54. See S. REP. No. 94-755, at 20 (1976).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
2008l
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communications to the NSA from 1945 to 1975.59 He also stated that "[a]s
long as [the NSA's] activities remain essentially uncontrolled and cloaked
in undue secrecy, Americans cannot be certain that their privacy is not
being silently invaded.,
60
The practical effect of FISA was that, instead of the NSA soliciting
telecommunications companies for unregulated access to private
information, 61 it now must apply for a FISA warrant through a two-part
process.62 First, the federal officer applying for the warrant must submit
"an application signed by a [Department of Justice (DOJ)] attorney" along
with a signed affidavit by either an NSA or FBI official.63 The affidavit
must contain facts that establish "probable cause to believe that ... the
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign [government or agent]. 64
Second, a high-ranking Executive Branch official must sign a
certification,65 which states in part "that the certifying official deems the
information sought to be foreign intelligence information" that the
government needs.66 Once completed, the federal officer must file the
warrant application with the FISA court, which is responsible for reviewing
the warrant applications.67 The court is composed of eleven district
judges, 68 each of which serves a one-time, seven-year term.69 There is also
a court of review, composed of three court of appeals or district court
judges.70 The Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court appoints all of the
judges.71
Fast-forward to the year 2001, a mere seven days after the attacks on
September 11 (9/11), Congress granted President George W. Bush the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).72 The AUMF authorized
59. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearing on S. 1566 Before the S.
Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights ofAmericans of the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th
Cong. 165 (1978) (statement of David L. Watters, Consultant, American Privacy Foundation).
60. Id.
61. Leslie Cauley, NSA has Massive Database ofAmericans'Phone Calls, USA TODAY,
May 11, 2006, at IA.
62. David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 487, 490
(2006).
63. Id.
64. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2005).
65. Kris, supra note 62.
66. 50 U.S.C. § 1804.
67. Id. § 1803.
68. Id. § 1803(a)(1).
69. Id. § 1803(d).
70. Id. § 1803(b).
71. Id. § 1803(a)-(b).
72. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
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the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks... in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism. . . . During AUMF debates in the United
States Senate, Democrat Patrick Leahy of Vermont reassured Americans by
stating: "We will maintain our democracy, and with justice, we will use our
strength. We will not lose our commitment to the rule of law, no matter
how much the provocation, because that rule of law has protected us
throughout the centuries. It has created our democracy. 74 Despite Senator
Leahy's reassurances, the hastily enacted AUMF was the cornerstone of
every legal justification for the Bush Administration's actions with respect
to warrantless surveillance.75
Perhaps the most widely known piece of legislation passed by
Congress since 9/11 is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Patriot Act),
which came only thirty-eight days after the AUMF, and amended FISA in
two important ways.76 First, under section 206, the Patriot Act abolished
the need for federal officials to seek a warrant for each communication
device that a suspect was using.77 Instead it "allows a single wiretap to
legally 'roam' from device to device, to tap the person rather than the
phone. 78 Second, under section 218, collecting intelligence information
on a suspect no longer had to be "the purpose" of the investigation; it just
has to be "a significant purpose. 79
The NSA's program involves massive amounts of data collection 8
with scarcely any oversight or accountability. 81  When asked about
telecommunications companies' cooperation with the NSA program, one
technology expert stated that the NSA has the "capability of an enormous
vacuum operation to sweep up data., 82  Conversely, if the government
knows a terrorist's identity or uncovers that an individual conducted some
(2001) (codified with some differences in language at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2008)).
73. Id.
74. S. Res. 350, 109th Cong. (2006).
75, See, e.g., DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 1-3.
76. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2008); Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
77. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 § 206.
78. John Podesta, USA Patriot Act: The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, 29 HUM. RTs. MAG.
1, Winter 2002, at 3, 4.
79. Id. at 3, 7 (emphasis added).
80. Cauley, supra note 61.
81. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1.
82. Lichtblau & Risen, Spy Agency, supra note 8.
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type of illegal activity, then perhaps additional surveillance to ascertain
their whereabouts would be justified. Instead, the Bush Administration
weakened the requirements for conducting surveillance on Americans
without justifying why it targeted certain individuals.
8 3
Even more disconcerting is the fact that, according to national
security and telecommunications experts, "even if the NSA seeks to adhere
closely to the rules that Mr. Bush has set, the logistics of the program may
make it difficult to ensure that the rules are being followed., 84 Robert
Morris, a former NSA scientist, stated that the complication arises because
it is difficult to determine where a call begins and ends, especially with
roaming cell phones and voice-over-Internet technology.85 With the rise of
digital and computerized systems, even basic concepts such as how
communications get from origin to destination have changed. 6 Instead of
taking the shortest direct route to a destination, "[c]omputerized systems
determine the most efficient routes for digital 'packets' of electronic
communications depending on the speed and congestion on the
networks."87  Consequently, "switches carrying calls from Cleveland to
Chicago, for example, may also be carrying calls from Islamabad to
Jakarta. ' ' 88 As a result, in order to effectively monitor communications, the
NSA must check nearly every voice communication that passes through the
United States to ensure that it gets all domestic to foreign traffic, and vice
versa.
89
B. History Repeats Itself
Even before the dust settled at Ground Zero after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, Congress granted President Bush broad powers to address the
terrorist threat in the name of domestic security.90 Therefore, when the
NSA was at the center of a wiretapping scandal involving American
83. Podesta, supra note 78, at 3, 7.
84. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2005, atAl.
85. Id.
86, JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 49-50 (2006).
87. Id. at 50.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 49-50.
90. See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (explaining that a paragraph has been added to Section 103 of the International
Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1702) to broaden the President's powers).
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citizens, the Bush Administration quickly asserted its legal authority to
determine the validity of the program.9' Some Republicans complained of
the need to modernize intelligence-gathering methods, while Democrats,
like House Representative Adam Schiff of California, tried to introduce
legislation to block financing of the NSA program.92 Dick Cheney,
emboldened by his status as Vice President, stated that, with regard to
FISA, "[t]he [P]resident of the United States needs to have his
constitutional powers unimpaired ... in terms of the conduct of national
security policy. '93  Vice President Cheney also stated that the DOJ
repeatedly reviewed the program to ensure its constitutionality and the
constitutionality of the Patriot Act 94-sentiments echoed by then-serving
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.95
According to DOJ attorneys, the primary basis for this presidential
power is in the Constitution.96 Courts have broadly construed the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief, empowering the President to
defend the nation and its citizens. 97  In United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., the Supreme Court held that the President is the "sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations. 98
Therefore, DOJ attorneys argued that the President's power to create the
NSA program stemmed from his inherent constitutional power to act
against foreign powers during a time of war.99
The second basis under which President Bush claimed to derive the
power to order warrantless surveillance came from authority granted to him
under the AUMF. 0 0 The AUMF was the cornerstone of the Bush
Administration's justification for the surveillance program because it
91. See DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 6-7 (explaining the DOJ's oversight and
analysis of the legal basis for the NSA activities described by the President).
92. Eric Lichtblau, Critics of Wiretapping Oppose a Plan for a Decision on the Program by
a Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A10.
93. Shane, supra note 30.
94. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Rice Defends Domestic Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2005, at A28.
95. Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Invokes Actions of Other Presidents in Defense of U.S. Spying,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at AI9.
96. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 1, 6.
97. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 103 (2006).
98. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
99. See DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 1, 6 (explaining that the president had such
powers and his actions were constitutional); but see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 579 (1952) (holding that the president did not have constitutional authority to seize
steel mills during a nationwide strike of steelworkers that jeopardized national defense).
100. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 2.
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specifically authorized the President to "use all necessary and appropriate
force" to prevent "any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States."' 01  DOJ attorneys under the Bush Administration also
claimed that presidential action under AUMF satisfied the statutory
exception clause in FISA,10 2 which states that a person is guilty of violating
FISA if he or she engages in electronic surveillance, unless that
surveillance is expressly authorized by statute. 0 3 Accordingly, President
Bush claimed that he followed FISA requirements when he created the
NSA program.1
0 4
Finally, under Justice Jackson's oft-cited "tripartite framework" from
the Court's 1952 plurality decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,105 the Bush Administration asserted that President Bush was
actually at the "zenith" of his powers because he acted with congressional
approval via AUMF.10 6 In his concurring opinion in Youngstown, Justice
Jackson established the judicial framework that determines the President's
inherent emergency powers based on the level of congressional
acquiescence. 0 7 The President is authorized to act as long as Congress has
either approved the action or remained silent on the issue. 0 8 Conversely, if
the President acts against the express or implied will of Congress, then "he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter."' 0 9
At first blush, the arguments set forth by the DOJ attorneys for the
Bush Administration appeared to be based upon sound legal precedent and
backed by congressional approval. But a closer look at the Bush
Administration's legal reasoning reveals unfounded assumptions and
circular logic. There are three flaws with the arguments set forth: first, the
President's inherent constitutional powers cannot be used to conduct
101. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
102. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 17-18.
103. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a) (2005).
104. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 17.
105. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Although the decision was a plurality, Justice Jackson's concurrence has been the
predominant test for the determination of the extent of executive powers. See Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 473 (1998); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 583 (2004).
106. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 2, 11.
107. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38.
108. Id. at 635-37.
109. Id. at 637.
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electronic surveillance on American citizens domestically;" 0 second, the
Senate did not intend to support a domestic warrantless wiretapping
program when it passed the AUMF;1 1 and third, the program violated
FISA.
1 12
Although the Bush Administration correctly argued that the
President's power is inherent in the Constitution, such a power only applies
in the context of foreign surveillance.1 13  Nevertheless, former Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales and other members of the Bush Administration
admitted that there had been instances of domestic spying.1
14
Commentators suggested that the Constitution did not grant the President
the authority to enact programs that spy on Americans.1 15  In fact, past
presidential abuse is one of the main reasons why FISA was enacted.'
1 6
When the Church Committee gave its final report to Congress, revelations
of domestic wiretapping by the Nixon Administration led Congress to pass
legislation to limit such surveillance actions." 7  Moreover, in drafting
FISA, Congress stated that its intention was to "circumscribe any claim of
inherent presidential authority to conduct electronic surveillance ...."118
In fact, language that specifically recognized such inherent presidential
authority was deleted from Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), a law that set rules for obtaining
110. See Neff, supra note 50, at 908-10.
111. See S. Res. 350, 109th Cong. (2006).
112. Although the district court initially found the program in violation of FISA, on appeal
the Sixth Circuit reversed because the plaintiffs failed to show that the "NSA's surveillance
program include[s] the sort of conduct that would satisfy FISA's definition of 'electronic
surveillance'...." ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 682 (6th Cir. 2007). While the Sixth Circuit's
decision was particular to the plaintiffs, the district court's decision focused on the underlying
statutory policy. See Adam Liptak & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Judge Finds Wiretap Actions Violate
the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at Al. It is on this broader basis the author asserts the
illegality of the NSA program with respect to FISA.
113. See Neff, supra note 50, at 904-10.
114. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 6; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1.
115. See Katherine Wong, Recent Developments: The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program,
43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 527-28 (2006).
116. See Neff, supra note 50, at 914.
117. Id. (stating that "[tihe legislative history of FISA reveals that the statute's purpose was
to balance concerns about the presidential abuse of power through unilateral determination[s] of
when national security justifies domestic spying against the need for the legitimate use of
electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information"); see also Memorandum from
Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys, Am. Law Div., Cong. Research
Serv., Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign
Intelligence Information 13 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/mO0506.pdf [hereinafter Bazan & Elsea].
118. Bazan & Elsea, supra note 117, at 27.
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wiretaps within the United States. 11 9
The Bush Administration also asserted that the President acted at his
zenith of power because Congress supported the NSA program when it
enacted the AUMF.120 However, this argument was also flawed. Under the
third category of Justice Jackson's framework in Youngstown, the President
cannot utilize his inherent powers if his actions expressly or inherently
conflict with the will of Congress.' 2 1  In response to the Bush
Administration's continued reliance on the AUMF as justification for the
program, members of the Senate passed Resolution 350 on January 20,
2006.122 The resolution stated that the Senate did not authorize warrantless
domestic surveillance of United States citizens when it voted to enact the
AUMF.123 Upon the passage of Resolution 350, Senator Leahy condemned
the program, stating that "[t]he Framers built checks and balances into our
system specifically to counter such abuses and undue assertions of power
... Once lost or eroded, liberty is difficult if not impossible to restore."'
' 24
Therefore, under the third category from Youngstown, the President had no
inherent constitutional authority to create the NSA program because he
acted in the face of congressional disapproval. Although this one-house
resolution did not have a legal effect on the previously enacted law, it
implied that the President essentially created his inherent authority by
interpreting the language in AUMF to authorize the NSA program. 1
25
The third flaw in the Bush Administration's reasoning was that the
program completely disregards the congressionally approved procedures
set forth under FISA. Attorneys from the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) contended that the AUMF did not give the President power to
authorize the NSA program because Congress expressly stated that FISA
and Title III should be "the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance... may be conducted."' 126 Without the AUMF to satisfy the
statutory exception clause within FISA, the exception can no longer apply.
Therefore, the Bush Administration unjustly ignored a federal law that
specifically deals with wiretapping regulations. 127  Former Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales acknowledged that he was well aware the Bush
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (2000).
120. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 17.
121. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
122. S. Res. 350, 109th Cong. (2006).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Bazan & Elsea, supra note 117, at 15.
127. See Neff, supra note 50, at 901-02.
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Administration was legally bound to follow FISA, stating "[w]e have had
discussions with Congress in the past.., as to whether or not FISA could
be amended to allow us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we
were advised that that would be difficult, if not impossible." 128 Realizing
that the ratification of amendments to FISA was unlikely, the Bush
Administration circumvented the statute by asserting executive power
under AUMF. 129 The statute did not provide an adequate legal basis for the
President to create a warrantless surveillance program, yet he did just
that. 130
III. TELECOM IMMUNITY
A. The Threat of Checks and Balances
Along with the legal challenges discussed in Part II above, the New
York Times' (Times) exposure of the National Security Agency (NSA)
wiretapping program also created a wave of lawsuits against both the NSA
and major telecommunications companies that assisted the Bush
Administration.' 3' The first cases came less than a month after the Times
article exposed the hidden program. 132 However, unlike the companies at
the center of the Church Committee investigations in the 1970s, the
companies implicated in the NSA scandal did not appear to have any
guaranteed immunity. 133 Perhaps even more alarming, at least for AT&T,
was the defection of former employees who had inside knowledge of the
program and were willing to testify.
134
In Hepting v. AT&T Corp., one of the first major suits filed against
AT&T, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) asserted that companies
like AT&T made the NSA program possible and that they should not
simply succumb to the will of the President. 35 According to Mark Klein, a
128. Gonzales & Hayden, supra note 5.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); see also Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
132. See, e.g., Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
133. See Snider, supra note 40.
134. See John Markoff & Scott Shane, Documents Show Link Between A T&T and Agency in
Eavesdropping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at A17.
135. Class Action Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2,
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-672 VRW (N.D. Cal. 2006), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/att-complaint.pdf; see also Ryan Singel, AT&T Sued Over
NSA Eavesdropping, WIRED, Jan. 31, 2006,
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witness and former AT&T technician, AT&T created a special room in its
San Francisco facility to be supervised by the NSA.1 36  AT&T used a
device called a "splitter" to make a copy of all Internet activity and emails
from customers, and then diverted the information to the NSA room.
37
AT&T used equipment inside this room to analyze contents and traffic
patterns of communications. 138 Mr. Klein also testified that only people
with NSA clearance had access to the room.' 39  The EFF eventually
obtained evidence of at least fifteen of these sites, meaning "probably well
over half of AT&T's purely domestic traffic was diverted to the NSA.'
40
In response, the government asserted the "state secrets privilege," a
legal doctrine that excludes evidence based on the government's assertion
that revealing such evidence may endanger national security. 141  As
constitutional law and civil rights attorney, Glenn Greenwald, stated,
"[o]ne of the odd-and dangerous-features of this privilege doctrine is
that, in many cases, courts allow the Government to assert the privilege
without even submitting the documents in question to a judge for the judge
to review in secrecy ....,,142 This means that the "Executive Branch can
decree that the documents should not be disclosed because disclosure will
harm national security," and it is usually "blindly accepted without anyone
reviewing its truthfulness or propriety."' 143 From the time the privilege was
created in 1953,144 until 1976, it was invoked a grand total of four times.145
After the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the Bush Administration
invoked the privilege a whopping twenty-three times, five of those in 2006
alone. 1
46
The first major legal blow to the Bush Administration on the
surveillance issue came in July 2006 when Judge Vaughn Walker of the
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/O1/70126/.
136. Electronic Frontier Foundation, AT&T's Role in Dragnet Surveillance of Millions of Its
Customers, http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/ATT-onepg_3.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Markoff & Shane, supra note 134; see also Lyons, supra note 14.
142. Glenn Greenwald, Building the Secrecy Wall Higher and Higher,
http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/04/building-secrecy-wall-higher-and.html (Apr. 29,
2006).
143. Id.
144. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
145. Bernard Hibbitts, DOJ Wants NSA Wiretapping Suits Dismissed on State Secrets Basis,
JURIST, May 28, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/05/doj-wants-nsa-wiretapping-
suits.php.
146. Id.
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Northern District of California denied both the government's state secrecy
claim and AT&T's immunity claim in Hepting.'47 In rejecting the secrecy
claim, Judge Walker stated that "[b]ecause of the public disclosures by the
government and AT&T, the court cannot conclude that merely maintaining
this action creates a 'reasonable danger' of harming national security."'
148
The court also denied AT&T's motion to dismiss.' 49 The motion was
based in part on AT&T's assertion that "telecommunications providers are
immune from suit if they receive a government certification authorizing
them to conduct electronic surveillance.0 50 AT&T further asserted that the
burden rests upon the EFF, as the plaintiff, to plead that AT&T lacks such
certification.15' The court cleverly skirted this issue stating that it "need not
decide whether plaintiffs must plead affirmatively the absence of a
certification because the present complaint, liberally construed, alleges that
AT&T acted outside the scope of any government certification it might
have received."'
152
AT&T also contended that the complaint should be dismissed because
the EFF failed to plead the absence of AT&T's common law immunity.
153
AT&T asserted that its immunity "grew out of recognition that
telecommunications carriers should not be subject to civil liability for
cooperating with government officials conducting surveillance activities.
That is true whether or not the surveillance was lawful."' 54 Again, the
court rejected this argument, stating that application of such immunity
would undermine the language of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978's (FISA) certification provision. 5 5 Specifically, the certification
provision requires authorized written certification from a government
official. 56  Therefore, applying this common law immunity would "in
essence be nullifying the procedural requirements of that statutory
provision .... Although the EFF prevailed in the lower court, AT&T
appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit, which released a two sentence order
stating: "In light of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 1 10-
147. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1006, 1010-11 (N.D. Cal. 2006);
see also Markoff, Judge Declines, supra note 16.
148. Hepting, 439 F. Supp. at 994.
149. Id. at 1011.
150. Id. at 1001.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1002.
153. Id. at 1003.
154. Hepting, 439 F. Supp. at 1003.
155. Id. at 1005-06.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1006.
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261, we remand this case to the district court. We retain jurisdiction over
any further appeals."'
' 58
Cindy Cohn, Legal Director for the EFF, hailed the decision as a
victory because it affirmed that the government must verify the
participation of specific companies in the NSA program in order to
establish immunity under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA).
159
Accordingly, the government may no longer claim that a particular
company's participation in the NSA program is a state secret.1 60 Thus, if
the retroactive immunity provision of the FAA is later struck down, the
forfeiture of the state secrets doctrine leaves open the opportunity for a
renewed suit.
161
However, the Bush Administration was able to successfully assert the
state secrets privilege in Terkel v. AT&T Corp.'62 The major distinction
between Hepting and Terkel is that, in the former, the plaintiffs challenged
"the interception of the contents of communications," whereas the plaintiffs
in the latter limited their challenge to "the alleged disclosure of records
regarding customer communications."'' 63 In Hepting, Judge Walker noted
Attorney General Gonzales' public statement that the government
intercepted communications where one party to the communication was
outside the United States and the government reasonably believed one
party was a suspected terrorist, regardless of whether the other party was in
the United States. 164  Due to this acknowledgment, the state secrets
privilege could bar a claim that an interception of the contents of
communications occurred; simply put, it was no longer a secret., 65  In
contrast, the plaintiffs in Terkel conceded that no Executive Branch official
had "officially confirmed or denied the existence of any program to obtain
large quantities of customer telephone records .... ,,166 Since neither
AT&T nor the government confirmed or denied the allegations that AT&T
disclosed records, the court held that the government's assertion of the state
158. Order in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-17137).
159. Ryan Singel, Appeals Court Punts on A T&T Spying Case Appeal, WIRED, Aug. 21,
2008, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/appeals-court-p.html.
160. Opposition of Plaintiffs-Appellees to the Government's Motion to Hold Appeals in
Abeyance and Plaintiffs-Appellees' Cross-Motion to Dismiss the Appeals at 9-10, Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 06-17132, 06-17137).
161. Singel, supra note 159.
162. Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
163. Id. at 900.
164. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 987 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
165. Id. at 994.
166. Terkel, 441 F. Supp. at 912.
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secrets privilege was a matter of national security. 167
The Terkel victory was short-lived for the Bush Administration.
168
Less than a month later, the Bush Administration took another legal hit in
ACLU v. NSA when Judge Anna Diggs Taylor of the Eastern District of
Michigan ruled that the NSA had violated both the Fourth Amendment and
FISA. 169 Judge Taylor wrote, "[i]t was never the intent of the framers to
give the president such unfettered control, particularly when his actions
blatantly disregard the parameters clearly enumerated in the Bill of
Rights." 170  Despite the ruling, President Bush and his administration
continued to advocate the legality and necessity of the program, stating that
they would do everything in their power to have the decision overturned on
appeal. 171 True to their promise, they were successful in getting the case
overturned by a two-to-one vote in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
because the plaintiffs did not have standing.172  The court stated that
implicit in the plaintiffs' alleged injuries was the "underlying possibility---
which the plaintiffs label a 'well founded belief and seek to treat as a
probability or even a certainty-that the NSA is presently intercepting, or
will eventually intercept, communications to or from one or more of these
particular plaintiffs." 1
73
Since the Bush Administration prevailed only on standing, it still
faced the possibility of legal consequences. 174 This threat, coupled with the
controversy that surrounded the legal justifications asserted in support of
the NSA program, required a permanent solution: clear legislation on the
issue. 175 It is no coincidence that less than a month after the Sixth Circuit
ruling, President Bush forced through the Protect America Act of 2007
(PAA)-an act that legalized eavesdropping on domestic calls and
provided immunity to telecommunications companies. 76  Before Judge
Walker's decision, there was no sense of urgency to close the gap in
intelligence gathering, as the President had continuously asserted,
77
167. Id. at 917.
168. See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
169. Id. at 782; Liptak & Lichtblau, supra note 112.
170. Liptak & Lichtblau, supra note 112.
171. Id.
172. ACLU, 493 F.3d at 657 (stating that "the injury that would support a declaratory
judgment action.., is too speculative").
173. Id. at 655.
174. Id. at 657.
175. Press Release, supra note 25.
176. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
177. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President's Radio Address (July 28,
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070728.html (quoting
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because there was no threat of legal consequences.1 78 However, after Judge
Walker denied the government's motion to dismiss based on the state
secrecy privilege, President Bush spoke of an important intelligence gap
that needed to be filled immediately.1 79  Hence, the PAA provided
immunity to telecommunications companies who aided the government in
data collection and wiretapping. 80  The Bush Administration was
determined to have legislation produced before Congress' month-long
recess gave it an opportunity to oppose the concept of legalized
wiretapping. 18' President Bush even threatened to keep Congress in an
"emergency session" until something was produced. 8 2 It was under this
political climate that the PAA was created.
183
When the PAA was passed, the Bush Administration's inclusion of
the immunity provision did more than just shield a useful ally in the war on
terror; it fundamentally disrupted the system of checks and balances.1
8 4
Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy of Massachusetts, one of the drafters of
the original FISA, stated that telecommunications company immunity
would "violate basic principles of fairness and justice.' 85 He argued that it
is "precisely because fairness and justice are so important to the American
system of government that we ask an independent branch-the judiciary-
President Bush as stating the PAA must be passed "so that our national security professionals can
close intelligence gaps"); Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on FISA Modernization
(Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070803-
12.html (highlighting the reasonable solutions to "address this critical intelligence gap" proposed
by the Director of National Intelligence); Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush
on Passage of Intelligence Security Legislation (Aug. 4, 2007) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070804-5.html (noting that the legislation
"will close a critical gap in our intelligence collection").
178. See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Judiciary Strikes Back, SLATE, July 21, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2146305/ (explaining that prior to Hepting, the NSA wiretapping issue
had gone well for the Bush Administration).
179. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Discusses Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Legislation (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071010.html.
180. See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, 554-55 (2007).
181. See Joby Warrick & Ellen Nakashima, Senate Votes to Expand Warrantless
Surveillance, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007, at Al.
182. Id.
183. See John W. Dean, The So-Called Protect America Act: Why Its Sweeping Amendments
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Pose Not Only a Civil Liberties Threat, but a Greater
Danger as Well, FINDLAW, Aug. 10, 2007, http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/dean/200708 I 0.html.
184. Id.
185. Press Release, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy on FISA (Dec. 17, 2007),
available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-release.cfin?id=3E414E2D-8473-434E-
AFCE-077E56AC 1338 [hereinafter Press Release, Kennedy on FISA].
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to resolve such legal disputes. ' 186 But there was more at stake for the Bush
Administration than notions of fairness and justice18 7 because the NSA
needed telecommunications companies to cooperate. 188  Before current
technology was widely available, the NSA could ascertain much of the data
it needed via satellites and microwave transmissions. 189 But because these
"communications are mostly digital, carry billions of bits of data, and
contain voice, data and multimedia," they now bypass the traditional means
used by the NSA.190 The NSA could not access such data without the
assistance of these companies. 19' However, with their assistance, the NSA
could analyze "the length of a call, the time it was placed, and the origin
and destination of electronic transmissions.,
192
B. ".... With [Redacted] and Justice for All"
The boiling frog syndrome states that if a frog is placed in a pot of
boiling water it will jump out, but if the frog is placed in a pot of cold water
that is gradually warmed up, it will sit still until it dies. 193  This same
concept holds true with regard to laws like the PAA. 194  Like the frog
placed in cold water that does not notice its slow death, American citizens
are not likely to recognize how the PAA will incrementally violate their
civil liberties all in the name of national security.' 95 "This cycle of terrorist
attack followed by government curtailment of civil liberties must be
broken--or our society will eventually lose the key attribute that has made
it great: freedom.'
196
The debate in Congress about whether to pass the PAA began only
three days before a month-long congressional recess. 197  The Senate
considered two versions of the PAA, one sponsored by Republicans and the
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Shane Harris & Tim Naftali, Tinker, Tailor, Miner, Spy: Why the NSA 's Snooping is
Unprecedented in Scale and Scope, SLATE, Jan. 3, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2133564/.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. FastCompany.com, Next Time, What Say We Boil a Consultant,
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/01/frog.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
194. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
195. See Timothy Lynch, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Preserving Our Liberties While
Fighting Terrorism, POLICY ANALYSIS, Jun. 26, 2002, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa443.pdf.
196. Id.
197. 153 CONG. REc. S10861, 10861-72 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007) (statements of members
of the U.S. Senate).
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other by Democrats.98 Despite additional safeguards against abuse in the
latter version,199 the Republican version of the Act passed °. °  After
affirmation in the Senate, the House of Representatives opened up its floor
to debate the merits of the PAA. 20  Republicans and Democrats were
immediately polarized.20 2 Republicans urged the House to take swift action
and close what they referred to as "a loophole" in the system.20 3 They
appeared to have two main goals: to pass the act before the one-month
recess and to attack the only Democrat-sponsored aspect-a 180-day sunset
20provision. 04 Congressman Rush Holt, a Democrat from New Jersey, spoke
of the tactics his Republican colleagues used in their attempt to achieve
these goals:
Do not believe these scare tactics. Legislation should not be
passed to respond to fear-mongering. Of course, we need good
intelligence to protect Americans, but we are being asked to
enter a "just trust us" form of legislation. Just trust an Attorney
General who has provided demonstrably false or misleading
testimony before Congress on this very issue. We are being
asked to just trust this Attorney General with unlimited authority
to authorize spying on Americans through this legislation
without oversight of the courts, even after his own Inspector
General has revealed massive abuses of civil liberties through
his department's unchecked use of national security letters.20 5
Representative Lamar Smith of Texas set the conservative tone by
emphasizing that, although the PAA would sunset in 180 days, "terrorists
do not sunset their plots to kill Americans.'2 0 6 Representative Trent Franks
of Arizona similarly reasoned that "[i]f we do not address the critical
loopholes in our foreign surveillance system tonight, our children may
198. Id.
199. 153 CONG. REC. S 10862 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
200. By examining the statements of the Republican members of the U.S. Senate, it is
evident that their version passed. See generally 153 CONG. REC. S 10861, 10861-72 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 2007).
201. See 153 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007).
202. In the final vote on this bill, only two Republican Congressman voted against it, while
over forty Democrats voted for it. See 153 CONG. REC. H9965-66 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007).
203. See 153 CONG. REC. H9954-65 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statements of members of the
House of Representatives).
204. Id.
205. 153 CONG. REC. H9956-57 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Holt). At the
time this statement was made, Alberto Gonzales was serving as the Attorney General; however,
he was replaced on Aug. 31, 2007.
206. 153 CONG. REC. H9954 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Smith).
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some day face a nuclear jihad .... Ultimately, these scare tactics
caused the Democrats to supply the necessary votes to tip the scales of
justice in favor of the Act's passage. 20 8 Ironically, such use of fear-based
reasoning-the belief that we must do anything and everything to secure
our freedom-compromises the very freedom we seek to protect.2 °9
During the August 2007 congressional recess, Bush Administration
officials attempted to downplay the significance of the PAA, stating that
there would be "strict rules in place to minimize the extent to which
Americans would be caught up in the surveillance., 210  However, many
Democratic lawmakers, like Congressman Rush Holt, were unconvinced
that the Bush Administration would impose any limitations on itself with
respect to domestic surveillance.211  Congressman Holt stated: "The
countries we detest around the world are the ones that spy on their own
people. Usually they say they do it for the sake of public safety and
security. 21 2
The PAA amended FISA in a number of important ways.213 Under
section 105A, the very definition of electronic surveillance was amended to
exclude any person "reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States.,214 Both the White House and the Director of National Intelligence
(DIR), John Michael "Mike" McConnell, asserted that this was a crucial fix
in FISA's outdated language.21 5 Prior to the passage of the PAA, Mr.
McConnell claimed there was a substantial amount of expert resources that
were being allocated toward the application process required by the FISA
court 16-a secret federal court that oversees requests for surveillance
217warrants. He argued that this process created a temporal gap that
207. 153 CONG. REc. H9952, 9956 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Franks).
208. See 153 CONG. REC. H9966 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Pelosi).
209. See generally Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
210. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Concerns Raised on Wider Spying Under New Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at Al.
211. Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, House Approves Wiretap Measure, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 2007, at A4.
212. Id.
213. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
214. § 105A, 121 Stat. at 552 (emphasis added).
215. Sept. 2007 Press Release, supra note 32; see also Warrantless Surveillance and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: The Role of Checks and Balances in Protecting
Americans'Privacy Rights (Part II): Hearing on FISA Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 13-30 (2007) [hereinafter McConnell, Hearing] (statement of J. Mike McConnell,
Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence).
216. McConnell, Hearing, supra note 215, at 21.
217. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1.
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hindered intelligence-gathering abilities.218 Furthermore, Mr. McConnell
stated that eavesdropping on foreign targets in foreign countries should
never require court approval because that was not Congress' original intent
when it first passed FISA.219
Under section 105B, "[n]otwithstanding any other law, the [DIR] and
the Attorney General may, for periods of time up to one year, authorize the
acquisition of foreign intelligence. 22 °  Despite the implication that the
government could interpret this section to extend to the Constitution, Mr.
McConnell believed that the PAA provided sufficient oversight by all three
branches of government, and therefore had a low capacity for abuse.221
Under section 105C(a), the Attorney General is required to submit a
summary of procedures to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) within 120 days, and renew it annually thereafter.222 Furthermore,
the Office of Inspector General (part of the Executive Branch) must
conduct internal agency reviews, and the intelligence community must
notify the congressional intelligence committees about every authorization
made.223
The PAA also includes sections 105B(e) and 105B(e)(1), which allow
the government to require the assistance, knowledge, or expertise of
virtually any individual and any information database.224  More
importantly, these sections prevent those individuals or entities from being
sued, regardless of whether or not the forced compliance results in
unlawful activity. 225 The latter section was included to address the rising
number of suits against telecommunications moguls such as AT&T and
Verizon, alleging that they provided private information to the government
without first obtaining individual consent from customers.226 Although
section 105B(1) grants immunity to anyone acting in compliance with the
PAA, these companies still faced lawsuits for their alleged actions prior to
218. McConnell, Hearing, supra note 215, at 21-22.
219. Id. at22.
220. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105B, 121 Stat. 552, 552 (2007).
221. See McConnell, Hearing, supra note 215, at 25-28.
222. § 105C(a), 121 Stat. at 555.
223. McConnell, Hearing, supra note 216, at 25-26.
224. See §§ 105B(e)-105B(e)(1), 121 Stat. at 553. In section 105B(e), the PAA allows the
Director of National Intelligence or the Attorney General to direct a person to "immediately
provide the government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish
the acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy." Id.
225. § 105B(l), 121 Stat. at 554-55.
226. See Markoff, Wiretap Suit, supra note 12; William Branigin, Bush Pushes House to
Renew Surveillance Law, WASH POST, Feb. 25, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dynlcontent/article/2008/02/25/AR200802250141 0.html; Greg Miller, Accord Reached on U.S.
Wiretaps, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 20, 2008, at Al.
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227its passage because Congress refused to make the PAA retroactive.
Despite Mr. McConnell's assurances that the PAA is sufficiently
overseen and not overbroad in its language,228 some of its language is
ambiguous, and thus creates potential for abuse.229 For example, under the
definition of "electronic surveillance" in Section 105A, the definition of
"reasonableness" was not expanded.23° The result was that the Bush
Administration was given free reign to conduct surveillance on almost
anyone that it could classify as reasonably believed to be outside the United
States, without any judicial oversight whatsoever. 231 Even more alarming,
the law remained silent on what action federal officials should take
regarding phone calls in which one party is located inside the United
States.232 Therefore, the Bush Administration was responsible for a process
that largely remains a mystery to this day: the collection and storage of
233such private communications.
After the PAA expired on February 16, 2008, the Democrats stalled
on renewing the legislation, and President Bush increased pressure on
Congress to come up with an immediate solution.234 Eventually, both the
House and Senate approved the FAA, retaining a retroactive immunity
provision235 that the House had rejected in a previous version of the bill.236
The immunity provision was central to finding a legislative solution, with
President Bush insisting on granting immunity to the companies.237 With
the provision included, the FAA effectively rendered moot all pending
litigation against telecommunications companies, 238 as evidenced by the
recent decision in Hepting.239  Attorneys involved in suits against
telecommunications companies vowed to appeal the immunity provision in
227. Eric Lichtblau, Role of Telecom Firms in Wiretaps is Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2007, at A13.
228. See McConnell, Hearing, supra note 215, at 13-14.
229. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881 (2008).
230. Id.
231. Fact Sheet, supra note 21.
232. Id.
233. See Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see also Fact
Sheet, supra note 21.
234. Branigin, supra note 226.
235. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881 (2008).
236. Declan McCullagh, House Votes 213-197 to Reject Retroactive Telecom Immunity,
CNET, Mar. 14, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9894474-38.html.
237. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881 (2008); Eric Lichtblau,
Senate Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at Al.
238. See Lichtblau, supra note 237 (explaining that "[tlhe final deal ... effectively ends
those lawsuits").
239. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
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federal court.2 40 They believed that the FAA only passed because 2008 was
an election year and Democrats did not want to look weak on national
security issues.24' In June 2008, Senator Barack Obama-then
campaigning to become the Democratic nominee for President-issued a
statement that supported updates to FISA; however, he did not support the
telecommunications immunity provision.242 Senator Obama stated that the
Bush Administration, with the cooperation of the telecommunications
companies, "'abused [its] authority and undermined the Constitution by
intercepting the communications of innocent Americans without their
knowledge or the required court orders.' 2 43 On the other hand, Republican
presidential nominee Senator John McCain expressed support for updates
to FISA, but not to renewal of the telecommunications immunity
244 +I1 iprovision. Nevertheless, in June 2008, Senator McCain stated that
"neither the Administration nor the telecoms need apologize for actions
that most people, except for the [American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)]
and the trial lawyers, understand were Constitutional and
appropriate .... " 245  These polarized views on telecommunications
company immunity illustrate the ongoing debate over the proper role of the
private sector in national security issues.2 46
The FAA also contains a provision that expands the length of time in
which government officials can invoke "emergency wiretapping
procedures. 247 The government can now wiretap without a warrant for
seven days, as opposed to the previous three-day limit. 248 Moreover, it
allows the government to legally conduct warrantless surveillance on
Americans as long as the Attorney General certifies the existence of
probable cause that an individual is linked to terrorism.249 Despite these
massive privacy intrusions, Democrats were able to slip in provisions that
require a special court to approve wiretapping procedures and generally
240. Lichtblau, supra note 237.
241. Hulse & Andrews, supra note 28.
242. Posting of David S. Moran
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2008/06/21/politics/horserace/entry4200105.shtml (June 28,
2008, 12:20 PST) [hereinafter Moran, Posting].
243. Id.
244. Letter from Doug Holtz-Eakin, Senior Policy Advisor for John McCain's 2008
Presidential Campaign, to Andy McCarthy, National Review Online (May 30, 2008) available at
http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MGUxZDA 1 YWJkMjQyZGNjYTI I OWExY2JmNzhm
ODczY2E= [hereinafter Letter].
245. Id.
246. See Moran, Posting, supra note 242; see also Letter, supra note 244.
247. Lichtblau, supra note 237.
248. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-188 1; Lichtblau, supra note 238.
249. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881; Lichtblau, supra note 238.
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prohibit eavesdropping on Americans without a warrant.250 The FAA is a
significant improvement over the PAA;251 however, because of the
continual lack of effective oversight,252 Congress must strike the immunity
provision from the FAA to allow injured parties to have their day in court.
C. It Could Happen to You
Scholars have noted that al-Qaeda has evolved into a movement that
has proven its ability to survive.253 Some scholars suggested that the Bush
Administration made "poor short-term decisions that sacrificed our long-
term security interests. ' 214 To more effectively combat the terrorist threat,
the federal government needs to understand why terrorists are willing to
destroy themselves to harm Americans. However, the goal of politicians is
oriented towards reelection.255 Concerns over appearing weak on terrorism
and domestic security, instead of understanding the underlying causes of
terrorism, are the driving factors behind the decisions the government has
made.256 For example, the desire for reelection explains why Democrats
handed the Bush Administration the PAA legislation, which disregards the
Fourth Amendment. The PAA allows privately owned telecommunications
companies to release detailed information about its customers without legal
consequences.257
Reelection is one fundamental reason why Congress has
overwhelmingly chosen short-term solutions over a long-term plan to
eradicate terrorism. 258  Furthermore, scholars explain that "the political
costs associated with allowing a terrorist to go free dramatically outweigh
the costs of infringing on the rights of innocents. 259 More importantly,
"the costs of a false negative (failing to lock up a terrorist) are often much
250. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-188 1; Miller, supra note 226.
251. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881.
252. See Lichtblau, supra note 237.
253. DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE
WAR ON TERROR 134 (The New Press 2007).
254. Id.
255. Hulse & Andrews, supra note 28 (stating that politicians are worried about political
repercussions).
256. See Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 211; see also COLE & LOBEL, supra note 253,
at 195.
257. Hulse & Andrews, supra note 28 (stating that Democrats do not support the
surveillance initiative because it grants "the administration too much latitude without judicial
review"); see also Nakashima & Warrick, supra note 211.
258. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 253, at 195.
259. Id.
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more visible than the costs of a false positive (locking up an innocent). 26°
Legislation like the FAA and the PAA are blatantly ineffective to combat
terrorism. Some scholars argue terrorists kill people to coerce the actions
of a government, and that is exactly what happened in the United States
after 9/11.261
Sadly, Americans have lost many liberties and freedoms since 9/11.
The story of Brandon Mayfield is one example.262 Mayfield was an
attorney residing with his family in Oregon when the Madrid train bombing
occurred in 2004.63 Despite notifications by the Spanish National Police
that fingerprints found on a bag of detonators at the scene did not match
Mayfield's, the FBI arrested and jailed Mayfield for over two weeks.264 An
FBI report released afterward stated that, while Mayfield's status as a
Muslim convert "was not a factor in his initial identification, it contributed
to the FBI's reluctance to reexamine its conclusions after the challenges
from Spanish police.,' 265 Fortunately, the error was discovered in time, and
the government agreed to pay Mayfield and his family approximately
$2,000,000 in damages. 266 Mistakes, like those in Mayfield's case, are
more likely to occur when a government views its citizens as suspects and
there is a failure to properly weigh the evidence.
The very fact that such a mistake occurred in this country should
cause concern. The terrorists have achieved part of their goal with respect
to the United States. 267 Americans unwittingly allowed the government to
increase its prominence in private lives, thus curtailing American
freedom. 268 Congressman Mel Watt spoke against legislation such as the
PAA, observing: "[W]orry about what [the terrorists] might be thinking
tonight, because they must be thinking: You know, we might have won the
battle, because we have the United States reacting and giving up its
constitutional rights., 269 To date, it is unclear on whom the government
260. Id.
261. See GRANT WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM: THEORY, TACTICS, AND COUNTER-
MEASURES 34 (Cambridge University Press 1989).
262. See Dan Eggen, U.S. Settles Suit Filed by Ore. Lawyer; $2 Million Will Be Paid For
Wrongful Arrest After Madrid Attack, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2006, at A3.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See generally Cyrille Begorre-Bret, Symposium, Terrorism, Globalization and the
Rule of Law: The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Relativism, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
1987, 1996 (2006) (stating a goal of terrorism is limiting freedom of citizens in open societies).
268. See, e.g., FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881 (2008).
269. 153 CONG. REC. H9952, 9961 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007) (statement of Rep. Watt).
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eavesdropped, whether these individuals had anything to do with terrorism,
and what happens to the collected information.270 In its effort to preserve
national security, the government has disregarded constitutionally
guaranteed liberties known only to the trial lawyers and ACLU who have
actually studied the law. 271
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Warren once wrote: "Implicit in the term 'national defense' is
the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation
apart... It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we
would sanction the subversion of... those liberties ... which makes the
defense of the Nation worthwhile. 272 A system of information collection
that continuously chips away at the rights of Americans, while
simultaneously impeding any possible legal remedy, turned our democratic
system into an Orwellian one.273
In addressing the Senate regarding the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 (FAA), Senator Kennedy stated: "In a democracy, it is the job of the
legislature to amend laws to fit new circumstances. It is not the job of the
legislature to rubber-stamp illegal conduct by the Executive., 274  The
Protect America Act of 2007 was the Bush Administration's attempt to
legislate its way out of its own illegal conduct. And when it expired, the
Bush Administration pressured Congress into passing a more invasive act
that has the added sting of retroactive telecommunications immunity.275
"In the name of making us safer, the Administration's reckless disregard
for the law has made us less safe, and countless Americans fear their rights
have been endangered. That sorry record demands accountability-not
immunity.
276
Congress must repeal the FAA. This is the only way to effectively
ensure that the Executive Branch cannot legally collect vast amounts of
personal data and that telecommunications companies should be held liable
270. See JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 48-50 (2006).
271. See id. (stating that "neither the Administration nor the telecoms need apologize for
actions that most people, except for the ACLU and the trial lawyers, understand were
Constitutional and appropriate in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001").
272. U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
273. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Books 1983) (1949) (reflecting a uniform world
where every aspect of life is controlled and organized by state).
274. Press Release, Kennedy on FISA, supra note 185.
275. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1881 (2008).
276. Press Release, Kennedy on FISA, supra note 185.
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for their assistance in the National Security Agency program.277 Equally as
important, Americans must never allow the threat of terrorist attacks to
compromise the fundamental liberties that are inherent in American
government. What Benjamin Franklin said has particular resonance today:
"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety."
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